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Introduction 
Perhaps the two most memorable ideas that are to be found in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement (1790), are those of the Sublime and of the Aesthetic 
Idea. Is there some ‘organic’ connection between them? In his 
‘Introduction’ to the Oxford ‘World’s Classics’ 1990 edition of Edmund 
Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful Adam Phillips very usefully remarks, “[F]or Burke 
and Kant the Sublime was a way of thinking about excess as the key to a 
new kind of subjectivity.”1 The notion explored in this article, and implicit 
in Phillips’, though not spelled out by him, is that a) the sublime object 
which affects the besublimèd2 subject does this by excess: the sublime 
object effects the feeling/intuition of sublimity in the human subject who 
encounters the affecting object. On the other hand, b) the Aesthetic Idea is 
an intuition requiring for its ‘conceptualization’ (apology quotes) an excess 
of concepts, an overplus of them which cannot be resolved into one, nor 
                                                
Patrick Hutchings holds an honorary position in Historical and Philosophical Studies at the 
University of Melbourne. 
1 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful, edited with an introduction by Adam Phillips (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
2 The word ‘besublimèd’ is a back-formation from ‘bewitched’, ‘bewildered’, ‘beguiled’, 
and so on. The accent è is from blessèd, stressed è used in the English liturgy of the Roman 
Church, for example, the Blessèd Virgin Mary. Unlike French accents that are specific, the è 
or é will do either way, and are not specific; they do not alter the pronunciation of the vowel, 
they govern stress only. Besublimèd indicates that the visitor to the Alps is – in some way – 
overcome, changed etc., if only briefly. It seems to me a useful word in its context. I have 
not found another, current, word that does the job. 
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into any higher order concept either. The person moved by the sublime 
object must rely on i) a congeries of concepts, ii) plus a crowd of 
associations in order to tell about it. Any concept will have a penumbra of 
associations: a congeries of concepts would generate a ‘storm’ of them. 
Kant is content with one ‘given concept’ and its cloud of associations. I opt 
for a congeries of concepts. 
 
We Are Now at Home with Sublimes, and Excesses 
What Phillips calls ‘a new subjectivity’ is no longer ‘new’, and we are by 
now altogether familiar with it. The useful notion is that of excess. Kant in 
The Critique of Judgement3 writing of aesthetic ideas says: “An aesthetic 
idea cannot become a cognition, because it is an intuition (of the 
imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found”.4 Here 
there is excess in the intuition. The excess of Burke’s and Kant’s Sublimes 
can be instanced by the Alps – European or Antipodean – or the Grand 
Canyon. Something is first ‘out there’ in the – shared – world: then it is in 
the ‘subjectivity’ of the sufficiently sensitive traveller. The Kantian excess 
is in the intuition. For this intuition the understanding searches for an 
adequate concept in which it might be contained. There is no such concept 
available. The cases of excited sensibility are on par: excesses, a) of 
overwhelming phenomena, and b) of the intuitions had from these, which 
                                                
3 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1928 [1790]). In §49, pp.175ff side number 314 Kant claims for aesthetic ideas a kind of 
outreach beyond the Critical limits “because they at least strain after something lying out beyond 
the confines of experience”. I would defend this despite the remarks in the final section of the 
present article which cast a chill over the outreach notion. The partial defence would be found in 
other remarks of Kant’s own. For instance: “In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the 
imagination, annexed to a given concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, 
such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that no expression indicating a definite 
concept can be found for it – one which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in 
thought by much that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive 
faculties, and with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit (soul) also”, p.179 
side number 316. Emphasis added. The crux is “much that is indefinable in words”. The intuition 
had is the intuition had. It is felt; and – on occasion – it “binds up the spirit”. If all that one 
thought an intuition had as its point were its – endless – unpackings, one would be valuing 
explication and criticism of art, music and so on, above music and art themselves. That intuitions 
cannot always be ‘verbalized’ is well known. It was for a while thought that the point of a text 
was to be deconstructed. One now may return to the notion that it is there to be understood. 
Meaning is not forever deferred. It is to be dug out – and probably by different gold diggers, from 
different pits following the one seam of metal. 
4 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 210 side number 342. 
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exceed the limit of any clear concept, and so must be dealt with by way of a 
mix of concepts. This mix is never, itself, reducible to any conceivable 
concept, or meta concept. 
We have, then, a double, or triple excess: a) The ‘overwhelming’ 
phenomena produce, b) an intuition as of that which overwhelms. The 
intuition overwhelms – in turn – c): The system of concepts available to the 
person who has this intuition. Hir only – rational – response to b), the 
intuition, is to resort to a congeries of concepts and associations, penumbral 
ideas and so on, possibly incongruous with each other, and actually not 
amenable to any attempt to unify them: when any attempt at unification 
under a second-order, or meta concept is bound to fail. By ‘double excess’ 
we mean, (a) + (b). ‘Triple excess’ – (a+b) R(c) – would indicate, a) the 
excess of a dynamic or mathematical sublime, b) as experienced by a 
person of sensibility, who then (c) finds in hir mind an intuition exceeding 
all or any available concepts. So: the only resort is to a mix of concepts – 
tenuous and unstable, probably: 
(a→b) → (cn + associationsn etc.) 
excess → yet more excess 
Beauty involves idealizations, typicalities and ‘central form’: The Sublime 
is too big to grasp, the terror is felt, the mind cannot quite cope. The 
sublime is not feeling as opposed to intellect, it combines both. 
In philosophical aesthetics idealization5 is not Platonic. The story 
that Apelles used a number of good-looking young women as models for a 
Venus statue indicates that he was an Aristotelian, working from induction, 
not from insights into pure forms of Plato’s kind. The sky-high Ideas were 
brought down to earth by Sir Joshua Reynolds whose interest, in the 
Discourses, in central form was again inductive: the typical, the splendid 
example of X was gained from experience and through disegno. Not from 
flights up towards the heavens, but by patient drawing from life. The 
eighteenth century was a time for exploration of the world and the human 
body. Botanical and medical drawings were all from life, even if the ‘life’ 
were a cut flower or a dead human. 
                                                
5 There are now two – almost contrary – senses of idealization in current philosophy. See Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, As If: Idealization and Ideals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2017). Appiah is usefully revising and reworking notions from Hans Vaihinger’s As If / Als Ob 
(1911). This was translated into English by C.K. Ogden in 1924. See Appiah for the sense of 
‘idealization’ that as ifing would entail, passim. 
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Curiously, the Dynamic Sublime may call less upon Aesthetic 
Ideas than does the Mathematical, where one makes ‘an aesthetic estimate’ 
of the blocks of stone in a pyramid, etc. Faced with storms, enormous 
waves, cliffs and so on in real life, or in a painting by Turner, Kant seems 
to offer one and one only thought, “I, as a rational and moral agent am 
superior to all that Nature can do”. The reader must figure to hirself 
whether in actual danger at sea she would remember The Raft of the 
Medusa, a Géricault: or in a moment of imagined danger, ‘abseiling’ a 
Bierstadt or a Clifford Still, remind hirself of other items in the sublime 
genre. Or would a simple, “I am above Nature” do? 
Our simple superiority to Nature can cash out as a raw realization. 
Or as a cooked one, confected in various – aesthetic – ways. Would a 
literary theorist about – almost – to plunge into a crevasse in a glacier say 
to hirself, “At last the real, the distinguished abîme”? The answer to this 
joke-question is “yes”. But iff the person, a bit too close to the rift in the 
ice, remembered Burke’s essential qualification, “terror is a passion which 
always produces delight when it does not press too close”,6 then all would 
be well. The person on the glacier would take a few steps back. To fall into 
the sublime one does not fall right into real danger. What Burke would 
have said of our contemporary passion for extreme sports I am not sure. 
New Zealand’s Southern Alps are sublime, is climbing them so too? As for 
bungee jumping, Burke would have, I suspect, found it too vulgar. Or a 
dangerous but not fatal equivalent of a public hanging, a spectacle popular 
in Burke’s day. 
If one concept will not do to unpack sublime intuitions, might a 
congeries of them do as I have suggested? Kant does not say this directly, 
but he does say “[The] aesthetic idea might, I think, be called an 
inexponible representation of the imagination”. He goes on a little later to 
write “[S]ince the reduction of a representation of the imagination to 
concepts is equivalent to giving its exponents, the aesthetic idea may be 
called an inexponible representation”.7 One notes that Kant uses the word 
‘concepts’. We might try to unpack the aesthetic idea in – not a concept – 
but in a congeries of them. We might choose to call a very neat set of 
concepts, an ‘almost-concept’. But it would have to be very neat. 
Essentially it would be an in-congruous congeries. 
                                                
6 Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, p. 42. 
7 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 212 side number 344. 
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An Example 
Writing of a work by the very distinguished glassmaker the late Klaus 
Zimmer8 – a small sublime object – ‘Construction 32’ (1997), of some 14.5 
x 25 centimetres, I found no explicit concepts, but suggestions – implanted 
by it in me or by me in it, I cannot quite decide – from Plato’s Timaeus9 
and Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea.10 The top part of the Zimmer panel is 
geometric, and clear in colour – a dark blue sharp geometrical shape on a 
light blue ground, seems to be falling – into an ocean, or into ‘existence’? 
The bottom part of the composition is organic, and curdled; it is baroque 
pearl-ish with an almost metallic sheen. Neither the Timaeus nor Nausea 
can be reduced to a single concept. And if they were, it would, one 
supposes, be itself an in-congruous congeries. Nevertheless what I gave of 
Zimmer’s glass panel ‘Construction 32’11 was: a reading. It was not the 
reading, because it is obvious that there is no such definitive thing possible. 
My reading has been useful, I have been told, to people who look at the 
photograph of the work. More by luck than by management, one pulled it 
off. Yet, Klaus Zimmer objected, “I have never read Sartre”. Works of 
abstract art can be rather like the double inkblots used by psychologists as a 
diagnostic tool. Their interpretation is as much about the observer as about 
the work of art. 
One gets the whole of Zimmer’s glass panel in by linking a 
‘general idea’ of the Timaeus to one in Nausea, fairly neatly. In Plato the 
Demiurge tries to make the world by infusing into something, it is not clear 
what, the five regular solids. A world made up of already-intelligible 
elements, the bet is, would be all intelligible, through and through. But as 
Plato – looking at the world as it is – writes, “the receptacle proved to be 
intransigent.”12 It did not work, this regular-rational scheme of infusing the 
                                                
8 Jenny Zimmer (ed.), Klaus Zimmer: Glass Artist (Melbourne: Macmillan, 2000). 
9 Plato, Timaeus, trans. H.D.P. Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 65ff. 
10 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Robert Baldick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965). See the 
whole of ‘Six o’clock in the evening’. 
11 Zimmer, Klaus Zimmer, ‘Construction 32’ (1997) photograph, p. 160. 
12 The text of Timaeus 30a.52d - 53b may be translated “the Receptacle was recalcitrant”, that is it 
resisted the introduction of the regular solids which the Demiurge put into it. Had they been put 
into something willing to accept them, then these regular forms – already understood by the 
Greeks – would have resulted in an understandable World/Universe. Alas this did not come about. 
When I lectured at the University of Edinburgh in the 1970s Ronnie Hepburn gave me the class 
handouts and spelled out the Greek for me. A whole section of a course depended on the 
‘recalcitrant’ translation. The notes and my Loeb edition are now lost. The nearest I have got is 
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unintelligible with the intelligible. The nearest Plato gets to the problem of 
evil in the Timaeus is: a world that is not rational through and through. (It is 
all much worse than that.) Nausea is about the sheer gratuitousness of 
being itself. “It’s all too much, and we don’t need it”, might just, sum 
Nausea up. Existence, Being is unnecessary. It is mediocre – the autodidact 
– or somehow disgusting, as is the tree root in the crucial section of 
Nausea, “Six o’clock in the evening”. The root is nauseating. Being is 
nauseating. This is too generalized to be convincing, as is the Scholastics’ 
omne ens est bonum. One recalls Hamlet’s all too familiar “To be or not to 
be…” uttered in an existential crisis, not in an Existentialist one. What 
Sartre is against is not essences – which do, or do not, not render a whole 
rational (which upset Plato) – but existence itself. However the difference is 
not too great. Existence comes not plain, but as possible essences realized. 
This is enough for the Common Reader; if not for Sartre for whom there 
are no essences – more or less. That is another story: one we will not go 
into here.13 
There is an amiable-to-terrifying inner dizziness which aesthetic 
ideas have. Too much for the understanding, but, so, too little adequately to 
do justice to what is intuitively felt. There is no one concept that will match 
the intuition. A set of concepts may not cohere. One recalls Gerard Manley 
Hopkins: 
Oh the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall 
Frightful, sheer, no-man-fathomed. Holds them cheap 
May who ne’er hung there14 
                                                                                                             
Gerd van Riel’s chapter ‘Damascius’, in Lloyd Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge History of 
Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), which gives 
Professor Hepburn’s favoured reading. This can be found under the heading 2.4 ‘Matter and 
Place: Timaeus 30a:52d - 53b’ unfortunately there is no Greek or any construal and explication of 
what is, it seems, an ambiguous text. 
13 My account of how small things may be sublime is given in Zimmer, Klaus Zimmer, ‘Sublimes 
of Light’, pp. 160ff. 
14 Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 4th edition, revised and enlarged 
by W.H. Gardner and N.H. Mackenzie (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’s poem, ‘No worse, there is none. Pitched past pitch of grief’ (p. 100, lines 9-10) 
contains the line “Comforter, where, where is your comforting?” and ends with one, at first 
reading disappointing, “Life death does end and each day dies with sleep.” Sleep rather than 
Eternal Life as one might expect from a Jesuit. However, one is at once reminded that many 
Christian tombstones bear the legend ‘Rest in Peace’. Even ‘And may perpetual light shine upon 
them’ in the Catholic prayer avoids any speculative giving of content to Salvation. It is useful to 
read poem 69 with poem 23 (p. 32) ‘Nondum’, which has as its epigraph “Verily Thou art a God 
that hidest Thyself” (Isaiah 45:15). Hopkins was no untroubled believer. For the ungraspability of 
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These lines are apt if only because they catch at once the inexpressibility of 
a spiritual intuition of possible but ambiguous comfort, in a world without 
comfort. And they call up in us the cliffs, the vertiginous terrors of Alpine 
landscapes. All in the one metaphorical envelope. And it is of course 
necessary that ‘meldings’ – as I would call them – generally have to be in 
metaphors. Concepts felt to go together, but not perspicuously rational in 
their relationship are ‘melds’. The language of Hopkins totters: “Oh the 
mind, mind has mountains.” It unbalances in the doubling of ‘the mind, 
mind…’. It is, also, what Burke would call “a sort of climbing or falling in 
miniature.”15 
Hopkins’ ‘the mind has mountains’ is a clear and apt metaphor. It 
might be useful to sketch the resemblances and difference between 
metaphors and aesthetic ideas. Metaphors have been discussed since the 
beginnings of rhetoric. And they have much concerned philosophers; into 
all that I do not intend to go. One might simply view a metaphor as a 
device depending on resemblances, actual or plausibly-found resemblances 
(and, occasionally implausibly found) between a ‘thing’ (in some vague 
sense of ‘thing’) and its chosen metaphorical analog. An aesthetic idea, on 
the other hand, not being able to be conceptualized, but suggesting one or 
more concepts not able to be crammed into any higher-order concept, is 
itself analogous to: a mixed metaphor. Mixed metaphors are in rhetoric 
risible, vulgar, and so on. Any aesthetic idea entails a mix – possibly 
unstable – of notions, where the clarity of any one notion is impinged upon 
by its proximate others. It would follow that there is an analogy between 
mixed metaphors and – essentially-mixed – aesthetic ideas, where ‘mix’ 
becomes, a) of the essence, and so, b) non-pejorative. What is comical or 
vulgar in mixed metaphors is not so in aesthetic ideas. Mixed metaphors 
are incongruous: incongruity of concepts in the mix of aesthetic ideas is, a) 
inevitable; and b) as I have suggested above, essential. As an Irishman I can 
tolerate an ‘Irish bull’. Such a one might even – seriously or in jest – take a 
bull to be its rather grander analog, an aesthetic idea. Try this as you read 
Ulysses or Finnegans Wake. 
The excess of the aesthetic intuition is not the excess of Mont 
Blanc, or of the mer de glace. But they can be likened. ‘No concept, but 
                                                                                                             
his own inner anguish, felt of course, but plainly able to be conceptualized, Hopkins resorts to a 
metaphor of the Romantic-Alpine. Not Shelley on Mont Blanc, quite; but some alpine place. 
15 Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, p. 110. 
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inexponible’ entails too many concepts, concepts whose congruity will 
always be problematic. The excess of the probably incongruous concepts 
can – as I say – be likened to the excess of the Grand Canyon; but the two 
are not identical. As far as I can see ‘likened’ is the best that can be done. 
However, it would explain how the sublime and the aesthetic idea tend to 
bleed into each other. How reaching for one, one may end up with both. An 
intuition caused by an overwhelming sublime ‘object’ could be unpacked 
only in overwhelming concepts. That is in a set of them which might turn 
out to be both apt and ill-assorted. 
 
‘Sublime’ 
The general use of the word ‘sublime’ is wider than are Burke’s or Kant’s 
technical ones. This can lead to a kind of reversal. We may say that J.S. 
Bach’s Passions are ‘sublime’ in a ‘loose’ way of speaking. Or in a tighter 
one – and here is the reversal – Bach’s music does not cause any terror, of 
the Alpine or any other sort. Rather its order reconciles one to the 
awfulness of the Good Friday Gospels. It breathes – for a believer – the 
Resurrection. For the atheist it remains sublime – this in a sense which is 
more difficult to spell out, since tradition provides an atheist at the St 
Matthew Passion with no a-liturgical language. By a-liturgical one means 
‘no established set of terms’ which could – as it were – replace the Gospel 
Text printed in German and English which the believer scans as the Passion 
is sung. 
What is “unto the Greeks foolishness”16 is sublimated in some 
sense by Bach’s positive and ordered music. Or the Passion music may be 
listened to, without much reference to the text, as in itself, uplifting. If 
someone feels somehow elevated by Bach’s music, ‘uplifted’ will do, by 
itself, as an avowal. However, we always hope for an avowal which can be 
somehow further expressed in words. 
 
God’s Predicates: Theology as Retro-Aesthetic? The Aesthetic Retro-
Engineered? 
In the Christian tradition God is thought of/‘thought of’ as having all, or all 
positive, predicates. The one God is both just and merciful, and so on. This 
simultaneously-predicated ‘God’ here is like ‘the Absolute’, which has, and 
somehow unifies, all predicates. This is all very problematic in that we 
                                                
16 1 Corinthians 1:18. 
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cannot think this unity of predicates; we just land ourselves up at the end of 
a language game having to affirm it. Absolute Idealism and ‘God-talk’ 
share the problem of reconciling the possible-to-inevitable logical 
heterogeneity of ‘Absolutely unified’ predicates, or ‘God-unified’ ones. 
The unity is affirmable, but not able to be defined. So, it does not amount to 
much, this while being, as to trying, the best that we can do. The predicates 
are mixed, even, possibly, opposed. Their unity is problematic. 
The mystic or whomsoever has an intuition has that, but not the 
concepts in which to express it. The theologian has the concepts but – in 
most cases – not the, crucial, intuition in which they are united. Mystics 
may – or may not – have experiences expressible in aesthetic ideas. Some 
mystics, after all, have been poets. The mystical or the aesthetic idea 
remains above ordinary conceptualisation. 
If – per impossibile – one avowed an intuition – in a more or less 
Kantian sense – of God’s (or the Absolute’s) unity, this could be no better 
than an aesthetic intuition. ‘Unpacked’ it would work – as far as one can 
see – only as a congeries of concepts. The suggestion that Theology is 
‘aesthetic’, that it is a theological retrofit is not too farfetched. First we 
have the in-congruous congeries of predicates of God taken from tradition, 
then – in the second place – we posit a unity. And we may, rashly, avow an 
intuition of this unity. This intuition – if had – might then unpack only as a 
set of heterogeneous concepts. Which is where we started out with: the 
usual and traditional list of God’s predicates. Theology has sometimes been 
thought of as poetic – Matthew Arnold, George Santayana – but it may 
very well be aesthetic, not as ‘impressive, awesome’ and so on, but because 
some of its so-called concepts prove, on inspection, to be themselves 
aesthetic ideas. ‘Ideas’ yes. But clear enough to become dogmas? 
Unfortunately, no? Or: fortunately, yes? 
There are two directly opposed views which may be taken of the 
Sublime: i) it may be a way into contemplative prayer, itself offering 
possible glimpses/‘glimpses’ of the numinous Itself. Or: ii) The sublime 
may be an Enlightenment substitute for God. Kant banished into 
unknowableness God, along with freedom and immortality. Kant read and 
improved on Burke’s idea of the sublime. He might be thought to have let it 
fill the place of God? This when the Deus absconditus had been, by the 
Enlightenment, pushed further into obscurity than SHe had been before. 
You are free to choose i) or ii), or even to vacillate between them. 
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If my contention that the sublime issues in – if ideas at all – only 
aesthetic ones, there is a possibly unwelcome consequence. My suggestion 
is that the idea of God is and can be only an aesthetic one. The unification 
of God’s predicates may be postulated, but we have no intuition as of it. 
My notion is not one to be welcomed in Catholic divinity schools. I would 
not be surprised to find it quite at home in some Protestant ones, indeed a 
notion there so well known as not to need to be commented on. In the 
Critique of Judgement Kant writes: “The poet essays the task of 
interpreting to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of 
the blessed hell, eternity, creation, etc.”17 
However, as far as God is concerned, “All our knowledge of God is 
merely symbolical”.18 And of ‘the Kingdom of the blessed’, and so on, 
what we get is at best a high fiction, not knowledge. The symbolical is ‘as 
if’; the plus sign – + – is as if someone had said, ‘Now add up!’ And so on, 
for many other symbols. 
There are no knockdown arguments in the Philosophy of Religion, 
and this is not intended as one. For a far more nuanced treatment of the 
question I suggest The Divine Attributes by Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. 
Rosencrantz.19 Nevertheless Kant’s First and Third Critiques remain as 
‘start-again’ points in the history of philosophy, and if the notion of 
Aesthetic Ideas has consequences for Natural Theology then one needs to 
acknowledge this fact. 
 
The Intuition of the most Important ‘Nothing’ 
There is a Catholic tradition of Nothingness-Mysticism called in one book 
on the subject The Ascent to Nothingness,20 which is about the mystical 
experiences of St John of the Cross. God in this tradition would be – 
                                                
17 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 176 side number 314. 
18 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 223 side number 353. 
19 Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosencrantz, The Divine Attributes (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
20 Alex Kurian, Ascent to Nothingness: The Ascent to God according to John of the Cross, ed. 
Andrew Tulloch (London and Maynooth: St Paul’s Publishing, 2001). There is a vast 
bibliography on John of the Cross. The book referred to here quotes as a half-title page the Sufi 
mystic Farid al-din ’Attar  “ride the steed of non-being to the place where nothing is”. This will 
do, for those of us who are not mystics, as a mystical injunction. But philosophy can cope, if at 
all, only barely with the apparent entification of no-thing. We may begin packing for a journey 
with a suitcase with nothing in it. If when it is in the end of a trip a trifle overfull, we might say “I 
wish that there had been a bit more nothing in it!” However, this would be only jocose-
philosophical for, “I wish I had brought a larger suitcase!” 
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possibly – that curious nothing which nevertheless ‘noths’.21 The mystical 
intuition could be either of the to-us-incomprehensible-unity-of-all-
desirable-predicates. Or, it could be of God as pure Being – Necessary 
Being – not able to be apprehended because being comes to us with-and-in-
predicate-packs. To think, or to intuit pure Being would be difficult-to-
impossible to minds where Being is something like an Existential quantifier 
over a range of predicates. Without predicates indicated by Greek letters, 
itself simply empty, the upside down Ǝ asserts nothing. The expression 
‘pure Being’ may get used in natural theology; the notion – however – is a 
less than perspicuous one. Scholastic philosophers ‘used’ – mentioned – 
Necessary Being, and one knows why. But ‘knowing why’ does not lead to 
any kind of intuition of Necessary Being. 
 
Necessary Being is Ungraspable Because too Full; Nothing is 
Ungraspable, because Nothing is of Itself Ungraspable, there Being 
Nothing to Grasp 
The mystical intuition of God as ‘Nothingness’ is utterly paradoxical. 
Nothingness is given a quasi-existential-quantifier insofar as someone has 
it, as an intuition of Nothing. The mystic is there; is Nothingness there in 
any sense of ‘there’? The mystic answers this question “Yes, Nothingness 
is there, just as much as I am or was”. Whether it has this quantifier – ‘in 
itself’ – content-as-non-content – may be unanswerable. The answer would 
be paradoxical at best. At most it would look contradictory. Nevertheless, 
the discourse persists and has its own status. Indeed, St John of the Cross 
was a Master of Negative-Mysticism. Itself understandably more difficult 
to communicate than a positive mysticism. And this, when positive 
mysticism is at the very edge – if that – of what can be communicated. 
Alex Kurian who wrote the book Ascent to Nothingness about St John of 
the Cross tells us something about the history of the word nada which is, in 
Spanish, ‘nothing’. This is the scheme of it: 
cosa nacida = something born → nada, a positive. 
nada negated → nonada; the ‘no’ is dropped 
and nonada becomes nada, ‘nothing’. 
This might seem an overripe case of ‘language speaking us’, but St John’s 
report of his mystical experience is St John speaking of what he – ‘saw’, 
                                                
21 ‘Nothing noths’; one uses this as a blank counter. One is not confident that it is meaningful but 
uses it simply because it is current – if suspect – coin. 
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‘had’? It is an assertion in language of something – where ‘thing’ is 
paradoxical – beyond language. All assertions in language – pace PoMo – 
are assertions beyond language. (Linguistics itself would be only a second-
order language about first-order language – itself a given). 
The Mystical experience of St Paul taken up into the third Heaven, 
2 Corinthians 12:2-4,22 the mystical vision of St Thomas Aquinas towards 
the end of his life, would have been verbalized as “Oh, all too much for me 
to recount”. This is not satisfactory, but we see that it might have to do; but 
“Oh, it was all this Nothing” would really perplex. But it happens, the 
experience and so the avowal, of Nothing. Tradition has it that after his 
vision St Thomas said, “Compared to what I have seen all that I have 
written is mere straw”. Asked if he would now burn his writings, he replied 
“Certainly not!” If you cannot rise up to Heaven as Thomas Aquinas did, 
you need his Summa, and the rest of the corpus, meanwhile. 
Whether or not mystics can have intuitions of things which non-
mystics have no intuitions of I am in no position to decide. Judgement is i) 
offensive, because mystics are not properly to be judged by non-mystics; ii) 
because in terms of all that one has said we non-mystics are unable to grasp 
or so to envisage the mystical intuition which may be being claimed. 
Having a Mystical Experience is not a Replicable Experiment under Royal 
Society rules. 
That the intuition of the Unity of God’s predicates or of the 
Absolute’s is – to non-mystics – possible one must deny. The – impossible 
– intuition were it possible would be like an aesthetic idea. This if it could 
be had, which it seems it cannot be except for very few persons. What is 
interesting is that an ‘intuition’ of God as Nothingness would not be like an 
aesthetic idea because, Nothing having no predicates or qualities, there 
would be nothing to unpack. To the prosaic mind God-as-Nothingness 
would lack qualities, and further, have no need – even – for an existential 
quantifier. Quite the contrary: even though an existential quantifier without 
predicates after it is null already. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 That was St Paul, although he speaks as of another. See Jerome Murphy O’Connor OP, Paul: A 
Critical Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 320. 
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Another Nothing? 
Reading Benjamin Moser’s Why This World, a biography of the Jewish-
Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector,23 I was startled to discover that there is a 
Jewish quasi-analogue to St John of the Cross, and his ascent to Nothing. 
To those who practice the Cabbalah: 
The notion that God is nothing is… a cabbalistic commonplace: ‘Creation 
out of nothing means to many mystics Creation out of God.’ Read in this 
light Clarice’s statement that, “above mankind is nothing else at all” 
acquires an unexpected subtlety. Not above mankind but inside mankind is 
‘the God’, ‘nothing else at all.’ If God is nothing, God is also everything: 
‘Life.’ This too is a Jewish definition: God is everything and nothing: the 
union of everything in the world and also its opposite.24 
For someone not inside this language game, paradox piles upon paradox. 
Further, beside her being a difficult writer, Moser tells us that Clarice 
Lispector was a mystic. James Joyce in his later works was a difficult 
writer, but not a mystic. Grappling with Lispector’s complex prose as 
prose, one may also be trying to construe the utterances of a mystic. But all 
this takes us well beyond the confines of the present article. At first sight 
cabbalistic nothing is not quite like whatever St John of the Cross 
experienced. However, we cannot go into the difference here. Have we two 
kinds of nothing? That seems counter intuitive: that nothing could have 
kinds at all. More probably we have two uses→senses of ‘nothing’. That is 
all in another part of the forest from the Sublime and the Aesthetic Idea. 
Here it must suffice to say that it is easy to think of God as nothing, 
because positively to think of God we, as often as not, come up – baffled – 
with nothing to say. On the other hand, for a Mystic to experience God as 
nothing is for hir to have ‘nothing’ to say; but the experience has been had, 
if of Nothing. And St John managed to say at least something of Nothing, 
nevertheless. 
 
Idealization vs Idealization 
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s As If: Idealization and Ideals, to which I have 
referred above, polarizes ‘Idealization’: Apelles vs ‘As If’ and the 
idealizations which are germane to as ifing. One senses here an issue 
                                                
23  Benjamin Moser, Why This World: A Biography of Clarice Lispector (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). Lispector was born in the Ukraine, and people found such a family name 
so odd to Portuguese-speaking ears they thought it might be a mere nom de plume; even that she 
might be a man. 
24 Moser, Why This World, p. 268. 
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tangential to the Aesthetic Idea notion. I must confess that I am as yet 
unclear about the precise relationship between Appiah’s ‘idealizations’ and 
the usual aesthetic ones, and about the relationship between as ifing and 
aesthetic ideas. However, the following remarks may be interesting enough 
to be worth making. The Greeks had an array of gods, and Apelles could 
represent Venus as a beautiful young or youngish woman. Monotheism has 
one and only one God. The Jews and the Muslims forbid images of HIR. 
The problem arises in the Sistine Chapel when one looks at Michelangelo’s 
image of God as a strong old man in a nightshirt who, having just created 
the Universe, is putting life/soul into Adam by that famous trope of the two 
almost-touching fingers. Is this an Apelles-type Idealization, or an As If 
icon? Clearly it is an As If; even Apelles could not Idealize SHe who is 
‘from everlasting to everlasting’ as he could a Venus. 
What of theologies? Run the three Abrahamic systems, singly, or 
as interweavings – which to an extent they are – and you get As If. This 
since no one, nor all three can give you a state description of God. I have 
always enjoyed looking at the spines of books on the ‘Systematic 
Theology’ shelves of any Divinity Library, especially in oecumenical 
institutions such as the one here in Melbourne. ‘Systematic’? At best we 
have a job-lot of would-be consistent systems, each and all as-ifing and no 
more conceptualizing their – absent – Referent with any more success than 
does an aesthetic idea. 
Vaihinger in his As If (1911) knew how as-ifs in the hard sciences 
could ideally morph into scientific descriptions which might very well 
hold-up as eventual solutions to real questions in science if it were not a 
rule in science that ‘solutions’ are at best pro tem. As If – simple models of 
X – might solidify after research into respectable systems. As Ifs outside 
science might make no progress at all. Who invented the As If? Hans 
Vaihinger? I have an earlier candidate: Blaise Pascal, with his wager ‘act as 
if you were a professing Roman Catholic, of a Port Royal sort, and it might 
very well pay off', and that in the end, handsomely. 
 
Where are we Now with Intuitions ‘Issuing’ in Aesthetic Ideas? 
The article has moved, it would seem, a long way from the 
melding/bleeding of the sublime ‘object’ intuited and the aesthetic idea into 
a possible ‘one’. The aesthetic idea involves for Kant a prior intuition, and 
we have got no doubts about the possibility of certain intuitions. Without 
an intuition there is no inexponible set of predicates/concepts and 
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associations into which one may attempt to unpack it, because the project 
of unpacking does not arise. With an intuition of an ineffable X the 
unpacking process is: a) proper; b) haunted by the – possible – mutual 
incompatibility of the concepts used in the unpacking; and iii) this 
unpacking is potentially interminable. Or, of an intuition one might say ‘I 
have it’, and then be forced to fall silent. The ‘it’ would remain unspecified, 
and incommunicable. This would possibly seem to be the case in at least 
some ordinary aesthetic contexts, and in super-ordinary retro-theological 
ones, rather often the case. 
 
The Sublime and Knowledge 
To return to the ordinary sublime, Phillips has another useful passage in his 
‘Introduction’ to Burke’s Essay on the Sublime. Phillips writes: 
“Knowing” is implicitly defined as the setting of limits and the “Sublime” as 
the impossibility of knowledge. So certain kinds of absence, which Burke 
calls privation are Sublime – vacuity, darkness, solitude, silence – all of 
which contain… the unpredictable – 
To ‘the unpredictable’ we might add the unpredicateable, because 
predicates are consequent upon a prior setting of limits; red is not black, 
and so on. The passage continues: 
the possibility of losing one’s way which is tantamount, Burke implies, to 
losing one’s coherence.25 
The Sublime is or would be in itself incoherent if limits are the prior 
condition of knowledge. The Sublime is a negative to the mind, if in some 
sense a positive to feeling. And to ‘feeling’ which amounts to an intuition. 
The sublime and the aesthetic idea seem to be on a divide between 
coherence and incoherence, and to partake of both. 
As a psychiatrist Phillips has seen a lot of radical loss of coherence 
in his patients. The sublime is a milder, more manageable case of this 
condition. The sensitive visitor to the Alps, or one listening to Beethoven’s 
Ninth or Mahler’s Symphony of One Thousand is besublimèd. This is 
healthy and enriching; the besublimèd has had hir sensibility educated. 
Earlier à propos the Sublime Phillips has written: “classification is… 
threatened by abundance” (italic added).26 The Sublime and the Aesthetic 
Idea are threats to classification and to concepts, because of their 
abundance. Their excesses. 
                                                
25 Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, p. xxii. 
26 Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, p. xx. 
The Sublime and Kant’s Aesthetic Ideas 
Literature & Aesthetics 29 (1) 2019 134 
It is the abundance of the Kantian aesthetic idea – inexponible – 
which already and of itself threatens classification. Concepts invoked in the 
unpacking will not submit to clear classification; too many of them, and 
not-all-together-coherent. Predications under the aesthetic idea will rarely 
be coherent; incoherence threatens from the beginning. It is an enjoyable 
incoherence. It is like – but not the same kind of thing as – the effect of too 
much champagne on the drinker, pleasant excitement with a trace of 
befuddlement. This, while the tone remains serious. The Sublime and the 
Aesthetic Ideas27 of Kant face off against coherence, logic and – ordinary – 
knowledge. Yet they are not nothing: “Chateaubriand wrote of the spectator 
of the sublime Niagara Falls: “S/he beholds a sight where, ‘pleasure 
mingles with terror’.””28 
 
What is the ‘cash value’ of Aesthetic Ideas? How far do they reach up? 
Down? 
Towards the beginning of §49 of Book II, ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, side 
number 314ff we find a passage which we have cited a scrap of above: 
The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense the rational ideas of 
invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity &c. Or again as to 
things of which examples occur in experience, e.g. death, envy all the vices, 
as also the love of fame and the like…29 
The things after the ‘e.g.’ seem eminently expressing through and in 
Aesthetic Ideas, for ‘envy and all the vices’ see Ben Jonson, Alexander 
Pope, or choose your examples, for these and for ‘death and fame’. 
However, one wonders about ‘hell, eternity’ and so on. Is Kant giving 
Aesthetic Ideas a special outreach-upreach-downreach? What in William 
James’ sense would be the cash value of these reaches? 
                                                
27 If Kant had taken up a Chair of Poetry he might have got there before the New Critics. He 
makes an impressive attempt at extracting something interesting from the fragment of poetry by 
Frederick the Great which he cites: Kant, Critique of Judgement, p.178 side number 316. Kant 
makes something of a text at first sight rather unpromising. 
28 François-René de Chateaubriand, Memoirs from Beyond the Grave: 1768-1800. This is cited 
from a secondary source, ‘Noble Memories’, by Peter Brooks, reviewing a translation of the 
Memoirs by Alex Andriesse in The New York Review of Books, vol. 65, no. 7, 19 April (2018), p. 
39d. By chance I came upon this in a detective story: “The forest terrifies him still, just as it did 
when he spent long afternoons as a child watching his mother work [on her paintings] here. These 
days it is an adult terror, a wistful feeling of mixed pleasure and pain.” From Pierre Lemaitre, 
Camille, trans. Frank Wynne (London: MacLehose Press/Quercus, 2015), p.195 (italic added). 
29 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 176. 
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Kant ‘for the sake of brevity’ confines himself to ‘a few examples 
only’. In effect we get one only, or one and a half. I quote, at some length: 
poetry and rhetoric… derive the soul that animates their works wholly from 
the aesthetic attributes of the objects – attributes which go hand in hand with 
the logical, and give the imagination an impetus to bring more thought into 
play in the matter, though in an undeveloped manner, than allows of being 
brought within the embrace of a concept, or, therefore, of being definitely 
formulated in language. – For the sake of brevity I must confine myself to a 
few examples only. When the great king expresses himself in one of his 
poems by saying: 
Oui, finissons sans trouble, et mourons sans regrets, 
En laissant l’Univers comblé de nos bienfaits. 
Ainsi l’Astre du jour, au bout de sa carrière, 
Répand sur l’horion une douce lumière, 
Et les derniers rayons qu’il dand dans les airs 
Sont les derniers soupirs qu’il donne à l’Univers; 
he kindles in this way his rational idea of a cosmopolitan sentiment even at 
the close of life, with the help of an attribute which the imagination (in 
remembering all the pleasures of a fair summer’s day that is over and gone – 
a memory of which pleasures is suggested by a serene evening) annexes to 
that representation, and which stirs up a crowd of sensations and secondary 
representations for which no expression can be found. On the other hand, 
even an intellectual concept may serve, conversely, as attribute for a 
representation of sense, and so animate the latter with the idea of the 
supersensible; but only by the aesthetic factor subjectively attaching to the 
consciousness of the supersensible being employed for the purpose. So, for 
example, a certain poet says in his description of a beautiful morning: ‘The 
sun arose, as out of virtue rises peace.’ The consciousness of virtue, even 
where we put ourselves only in thought in the position of a virtuous man, 
diffuses in the mind a multitude of sublime and tranquillizing feelings, and 
gives a boundless outlook into a happy future, such as no expression within 
the compass of a definite concept completely attains.30 
This is a very good example of what was called in my youth ‘practical 
criticism’ or ‘the New Criticism’. Kant shows how the little passage of 
poetry works; excellent. However, we get a piece of standard 
Enlightenment Humanism. There is no upreach or downreach; the reach is 
entirely horizontal. The Aesthetic Idea does not cross the Critical Gap, 
which Kant argued for in his first Critique between the known-and-
available and the noumenon in the second ‘Preface’ to The Critique of Pure 
Reason.31 What we get is, for its time, a commonplace. If one had hoped 
                                                
30 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 179, side number 316. 
31 Kant at Critique of Pure Reason B27 does not convince. Choosing, or stipulating without 
argument, to write that what we live in is a world of appearance, so there must be an x – the-
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that the Aesthetic Ideas were gazebos from which something beyond the 
everyday might be glimpsed, Kant’s chief of his 1.5 examples disabuses us. 
 
Single Concepts with Penumbras or a Congeries of Concepts with 
Penumbras All-Over? 
Without Kant’s permission I have referred to the Aesthetic Idea as cashing 
out as a congeries of concepts in its unpacked state. I need to justify my 
‘congeries’. Kant writes: 
the aesthetic ideas is a representation of the imagination annexed to a given 
concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, such a 
multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that no expression 
indicating a definite concept can be found for it…32 
To come clean, when I suggested in that the Idea of God could only be an 
Aesthetic Idea I began with a congeries – in this one case at least. God in 
the diverse theologies of all religions has a) a number of ‘obvious’ (quote 
marks for shudder) predicates ascribed to HIR which; b) do not on the face 
of it seem compatible. Forgivingness and justice; omnibenevolence (despite 
the ‘toleration’ of evil deeds committed by humankind); providential 
power, (despite building earth out of tectonic plates which – foreseeably – 
would cause the Lisbon earthquake of 1755) and so on. Anyone can list 
incompatible-pairs of God’s predicates whose union in God is stipulated. 
One might argue that the stipulation could be rationalized – if at all – only 
in an Idea which could – in some sense – contain, a) this excess of 
predicates, b) by giving us an as if insight to their unity in God. 
My first notion was that Theology was Retro-Engineered from the 
Aesthetic, where ‘Aesthetic’ was short for ‘Aesthetic Idea’. My second 
notion – now – is that not even an Aesthetic Idea would suffice. Why? Kant 
refers in the last passage of his Critique of Judgement, which one quoted 
above, to ‘a given concept’. The cramp – in effect a double-cramp – is that 
there may be no given concept of God, only a raft – or congeries – of 
concepts which one writes on the white-board around the word ‘God’. That 
this “set”, a) seemed to be able to be “unified” (doubt double quotes in all 
                                                                                                             
thing-in-itself – behind ‘appearance’ is a mere device. And a dubious one. This is a ‘metaphysic’ 
which pulls a pretend-rabbit out of an invisible hat. Since the thrust of the Critique of Pure 
Reason is anti-metaphysics it is odd that Kant starts off with a conjuring trick, and a very obvious 
one. Metaphysics – for all its faults – is usually not quite so easily seen through. 
32 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 176. 
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cases) in an Aesthetic Idea was attractive, b) but this seems not to work, 
even this. 
Dubious constructions of The Absolute – as in Bradley – can be 
built up. However, the Absolute, unifying ‘everything’ is to the mind which 
might wish to ‘behold’ it, a perfect blank. Difference rendered indifferent 
freezes the mind which is accustomed to understand the world of 
experience via a sorting out of different things. The Absolute is at bottom a 
paradox; the absolute coherence of the Absolute remains forever 
incoherent to minds unable to do without the principle of difference. 
Nobody who believes in God, or would like to believe, could 
tolerate God as a total blank. The ‘concept’ of God is not constructed as is 
Bradley’s Absolute. It is postulated, but so postulated that it is an Other, to 
Whom predicates are ascribed, when this Other ‘comes before’. Its 
predicates; and is so Other, that its ‘concept’ is given only as – as 
Wittgenstein might have put it – as a task. The notion of God and HIR 
existence must be argued for, when this “notion of God” is always 
problematic, a) as a notion, b) requiring its ‘referent’ to be shown to exist. 
The problem goes, a) beyond the obvious, and, b) even beyond our ideas, 
even that the most elastic of them, Aesthetic Ideas. (Even Aquinas’ ‘Five 
ways’ to prove that God exists seem in our day weaker than they were in 
his.) 
As Wittgenstein – almost – put it at the end of his Tractatus, ‘call 
in a mystic’. The cramp is then that what the mystic can tell/“tell” us can 
never be, clearly, stated: though Aesthetic Ideas may be part of the 
language of a mystic’s report of the experience of the Ultimate Other, they 
suggest something not definable in neat concepts. However, as we see from 
two mystical experiences – those of St Thomas and St John – for one saint 
God is Ǝn – existence to the nth degree, absolutely. For another saint God is 
Nothing; one resists writing ‘absolutely’ here. The upshot might be to say, 
“God is beyond both being and not being”. That, however, is not really a 
remark about God. It simply marks the fix that we are in, given the mystics’ 
reports. 
All of what we say about God is governed by the limits of our 
language, the limits of our world. God is, so, always other-wise, and 
elsewhere, except to saints and mystics, to the rest of us there are – 
moments. Moments only. God is the never-given, or the sometimes-given 
Excess. And well beyond the mere Sublimes. Or God is given as a Nothing, 
a Nothing which in some sense is. This although ‘nothing’ is used to mark 
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non-existence. ‘God as Nothing is an existent’. This is – of course – not 
intended as an ontological remark, made in good faith – or in good Faith. It 
is, as I noted above, an indication of a linguistic fix – that is, it is a 
mystification of what we ordinarily say to which we are driven in this case. 
‘God is both being and not-being’ is not an existential problem for God. It 
is simply a linguistic and, possibly, an existential problem for us. 
To construe these sentences as an affirmation of a-Theism would 
be wrong in the extreme. They are about us and the twinges of our minds, 
as we speak the only language we have. Our language is never enough for 
this excess upon excess. One might be tempted to take the experiences of 
mystics as empirical examples, tending towards establishing some grounds 
for affirming the existence of God. However, St Thomas’ experience would 
– one supposes – be ‘evidence’ that the Necessary Being exists. St John’s 
would seem directly to contradict St Thomas’. One might make this point: 
Mystics recounting their experience are not provided by it with a higher 
language in which to recount it. Once mystical experience fades, they must 
speak – basically – the language which we all speak. I think this point to be 
neat, but not conclusive. 
Buddhists have experiences, and some Christians who have learned 
some of the Buddhist, Taoist, and so on ways of meditation have 
‘equivalent’ (quote marks for shudder) experiences. But ‘equivalent’ may 
equivocate; Buddhists have no God. Any ‘Goddish’ remarks, a) by 
Buddhists, or, b) by Christians who have succeeded in Buddhist or related 
mediation look odd. ‘Western’ God-claims following from, for example, a 
Taoist experience are not watertight proofs from experience. It is more than 
plausible to say that mystical experiences are always read through the 
particular experiencer’s culture, theology, or other already-established 
belief-systems. And so on. 
I would rather be wrong about this, but on the face of it, it seems to 
be the case. If one dropped ‘God’ and settled for a ‘Something’, the 
problem might vanish. Vanish only to force us to define and locate the 
‘Something’. Pantheism or panentheism offer a way out; but not quite the 
way out that I for one can be quite happy about. If one believes that there is 
something in all religions one may call that Something, ‘The 
Indescribable’. The Greeks had an unknown god; have we an Unknown 
Indescribable, about whom we quarrel, despite it being the case that 
nobody’s description is any better than anybody-else’s? One is inclined to 
be a sceptical-liberal, in Theology/‘Natural Theology’. 
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Aesthetic Ideas can deal with excess, but not with an excess of 
excess. The double excess is, in essence, a conjunction of two excesses of 
radically different types. The sublime is excess of experience which entails 
an excess of concepts. The Sublime is an experience. God is not generally 
experienced, so is not – in the usual way – a Sublime. However, SHe 
would, (a) exceed all concepts if experienced, and exceed Ǝ(x)and ~(Ǝ) if 
and when experienced by mystics. For example, St Thomas and/or St John. 
Therein lies the difficulty, so theologies cannot take refuge – as seemed 
possible – in Aesthetic Ideas. The object of theology is both not given in 
ordinary experience, and not at home in the language which we have. 
Necessary Being can be mentioned but not thought. Nothing cannot be 
thought because there would be nothing to think. ‘The idea of nothing’ – at 
its extreme – would be both contentless, and totally Other. 
 
Coda 
To think Absolute Being is beyond us. To attempt to think Absolute 
Nothing would be blocked by a kind of cogito; my thinking of nothing 
would be blocked by my thinking, which would be if not quite a ‘thing’ 
close enough to being one. The only real analogue of Nothing in experience 
would be dreamless slumber in which my being there to add one thing to 
nothing – and so spoil it – would not be an experience. 
In a dreamless slumber I could not know, a) nothing, b) myself, c) 
myself confronting – if only in the thought – nothing. Nothing can, of 
course, be mentioned, it cannot be experienced; it would seem – too – to be 
unthinkable. Even to experience God as Nothing St John would have had to 
be in some way still there. Vacuity is a Sublime, but St John went beyond 
the Sublime. Nothing is as much an excess to thought as is Absolute Being. 
There are excesses beyond – even – the Sublime. 
If the only ‘real analogue’ of Nothing is dreamless slumber in 
which the sleeping person cannot be aware of hir state, then St John’s 
experience of God-as-Nothing would be as extreme, and so mystical, as an 
experience of Necessary Being. The crux of St John’s ‘vision’ (apology 
quotation marks) would be: an awareness of as if dreamless slumber. God 
would be revealing HirSelf as that which – short of a miracle (or… find 
another word, reader) – is impossible. This seems to make sense. However 
to call this a positive experience of Nothing is fairly obviously a linguistic 
cramp. ‘Positive’ and ‘Nothing’ are too ill-assorted for ‘a positive 
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experience of Nothing’ to be a proper expression. Even in poetry it would 
grate. Perhaps we may put it thus: 
a) A person cannot be aware of hir dreamless slumbers. Awareness of it 
could negate the dreamlessness. 
b) St John was aware of an as if dreamless slumber, i.e., the High Analog of 
a dreamless slumber: God-as-Nothing. 
Nothing has an existential analogue: as if dreamless slumber were 
somehow experienced in someway; the dreamer not absent as s/he is in ‘I 
think of Nothing.’ Necessary Being – despite having been endlessly 
referred to by Thomists – and others – lacks such an analogue. This point, 
as least as far as I know, has not generally been commented on. One might 
be tempted to say that Nothing is, so, more intelligible than Necessary 
Being. I – for now – resist that temptation. However, as an arrière pensée, I 
note that St John of the Cross may have seen God as the urBeing a Being 
before Being. This might resonate with if not fit into, ‘Oriental’, non 
‘Western’ philosophies which postulate n/Nothing as the ground of 
Existence. 
‘Being before Being’ is a locution which one would rather not use. 
It’s too close to Plotinus and his One.33 Were Aristotle still with us he 
would, I think, see modern Physics Newton-Einstein-Planck etc as real 
metaphysics, full of empirical content; much fuller than his own. What we 
now call ‘metaphysics’ is a kind of logico-poetic façon de parler useful for 
unriddling – as far as possible – bits of Theology. Theology has some 
empirical content, and a great deal of ‘peradventure’. Metaphysics is very 
much ‘peradventure’ stuff. So, ‘Being before Being’ is an expression which 
one uses with, on one’s face, the half-smile of a cynic. Cynics in their day 
were quite respectable. Or, as John Wisdom used to put it: “If you want to 
say that, say it with a smile!” 
 
                                                
33 The One: This was a serious notion for Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who neglecting the 
drinkers’ warning ‘Never mix grain with grape’ ended up somewhere between Kant (grain) 
and Schelling (sparkling grape) and ended with a philosophical hangover. See Biographia 
Literaria, Shawcross edition (reprinted lithographically 1907, 1967 (my copy), etc., p.188. 
This edition lacks, as does the earlier Everyman, the crucial footnote of Watson’s edition (E 
II) where Greek of Synesius’ Hymn has its last lines Englished: “… I have touched the 
One.” By 1975 the notion that everyone could construe Greek had evaporated. “For this 
relief, much thanks…” 
